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Abstract 
The recent upsurge of deforestation inside conservation areas requires empirical 
investigation of the causes and consequences of this alarming process. Local relations 
between the agents of cattle capitalism, neodevelopmentalism and contemporary 
deforestation, from politicians and ranchers to the traditional extractive populations of 
multiple-use conservation areas, are assessed. Whether, when, and how state, market, and 
cultural institutions support the hegemony of cattle capitalism – and subvert the logic of 
traditional lived environments – are analyzed. Theoretically, the article shows how moral 
economic transformations, from rubber tapping to cowboy lifestyles, alongside 
nodevelopmentalist policies, enable regionally dominant political economies to expand 
through deforestation.  




Deforestation – the long-term replacement of forest landscapes with pastures, mines, or 
tree plantations – and the degradation and fragmentation of forestlands are increasing 
around the world (Taubert et al. 2018). Tropical tree cover loss has spiked since 2016, with 
2017 being the second-worst year recorded; Brazil tops the global list by far (with 4.5 million 
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hectares lost in 2017), and most of this loss has taken place in the Amazon (World Resources 
Institute 2018). Given the worsening policy setting (Rochedo et al. 2018), the days of 
radically decreased deforestation rates are over, although many thought this problem had 
been solved (e.g., Thaler 2017).1  
The election of Jair Bolsonaro as the president of Brazil in 2018 has created an expectation of 
skyrocketing deforestation, especially in areas that had previously been left in relative 
peace, such as conservation and indigenous areas (Pontes 2019). Forest degradation within 
multiple-use conservation areas had already begun to increase before Bolsonaro’s election 
(Pedlowski et al. 2005; Imazon 2017). Several policies by recent governments directly or 
inadvertently paved the way for greater deforestation inside conservation areas, as I shall 
show here through a discussion of what happened in Acre’s famous Chico Mendes Extractive 
Reserve (CMER) before the Workers’ Party (PT)-led front lost almost all its power in Acre to 
the supporters of Bolsonaro in the 2018 elections.  
In the 1970s, the Acre rubber tappers started to demand de jure and state recognition for 
their established de facto territorial practices that were communally organized and 
consisted of family and larger commons: they sought not only land but specifically forest so 
that they could expand their avocation as rubber tappers (Porto-Gonçalves 2006, 168). This 
model was enshrined in subsequent de jure rights (Kröger and Lalander 2017). Arguably, the 
clear-cut slowdown period and low figures of 2012 were largely the result of a long 
sociopolitical process – ‘socioenvironmentalism’ (socioambientalismo; see. e.g., Porto-
                                                        
1 In 2012, a record low (but still high) area of only 4,571 km2 was clear-cut in the Brazilian 
Amazon, but by 2016, the figure had jumped to 7,989 km2 (Spera et al. 2016).  
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Gonçalves 2006; Gudynas 2016) – that valorized biodiversity and sustainable forest-based 
livelihoods (see, e.g., Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Hecht 2011). Forest people’s mobilizations 
during the Lula government led to the establishment of many new extractive reserves 
(RESEXs) and other units that conserved large forest areas as a cornerstone policy of creating 
barrier zones at the resource frontier (Hecht 2011; Fraser 2018). However, currently, rising 
deforestation inside conservation areas is eroding the power of the very core of this policy – 
the territorialized political process based on strong forest dwellers’ mobilization (see Fraser 
et al. 2017) – which brought much deforestation to a halt. The process of deforestation 
inside the CMER, described here as it happened before Bolsonaro’s election, is likely to 
expand.  
Global extractivism is currently expanding in many countries through the political means of 
authoritarian agrarian populism (Scoones et al. 2018), in which alliances of politicians with 
neoliberal, conservative-theocratic and coercive policies are a way for large capitalists to 
break the power and territories of organized rural populations seeking to protect their lived 
environments. The ‘populist’ part of this authoritarianism is well presented by the dynamics 
of the CMER and Acre. According to the five presidents of CMER’s five producer associations 
and a trade union president operating inside the CMER (personal communications, 25 
January 2019), 70% of the people in the CMER voted for Bolsonaro, who promised to ‘give a 
gun and a course on how to use it to everyone and let the whole of the Chico Mendes 
Reserve be deforested to build ranches.’ The discussion here helps us to understand how we 
got here, i.e., to see such authoritarianism (in relation to life; people and forests) as a partial 
consequence of the prior extractivist neodevelopmentalism. 
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Global extractivism comes in many forms; before the current authoritarian era, it took the 
form of neodevelopmentalism (see Hall and Branford 2012), of which a key element was the 
policy of the ‘progressive’ Latin American governments to promote logging, plantations, 
mining and/or ranching expansion on supposedly more equal social terms or to offer part of 
the overall extractivist rents as social welfare benefits to the excluded sectors, such as rural 
populations (Baletti 2014). However, this neodevelopmentalism has been deeply 
contradictory and conflictive as a policy from the very beginning (North and Grinspun 2016), 
as through massive support of corporations and infrastructure (Hall and Branford 2012), as 
well as other policies aiding mass-scale extraction, neodevelopmentalism has benefited the 
entrance of capital at the cost of the environment and the poor who depend on its actually 
(and not just discursively) sustainable use (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017). 
Neodevelopmentalism has exacerbated the existing power relations by granting most of the 
new power to the approximately 5,000 elite families of Brazil, offering greater possibilities 
for them to accumulate capital and political economic power through expanding the 
financialized commodity sectors (Kröger 2012). The thrust that has gained even more force 
in Brazil since approximately 2010, which has been characterized as ‘postenvironmentalism,’ 
features strong support for agribusiness, the creation of land markets, and the application of 
monetary value to environmental services (de Toledo et al. 2017).  
In this article, I will analyze how these and other possible dynamics have influenced and play 
out in the rapid expansion of ranching and the concomitant rise in deforestation within the 
CMER in Acre. The CMER is iconic given its namesake – if it fails, its loss will be much more 
symbolic than the failure of other RESEXs. The CMER is situated next to the borders of Peru 
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and Bolivia and a major interoceanic highway and presents a barrier to a major and 
established ranching/logging frontier (Maciel et al. 2018).2  
I offer general notes on the different kinds of ranchers within the CMER and through which 
types of relations they expand pastures. I argue that this pasture expansion is enabled by a 
moral economic change, which is visible on a subjective level as a change from extractivist 
attitudes and habitus towards a cowboy mentality and social relations that is promoted by 
the regionally dominant political economy. This change in landscape has major future 
consequences in that forest-based moral and political economies can no longer be sustained 
or developed in pasturelands, which means that in a few generations, extractivist 
subjectivities may also vanish, as they are territorialized habituses.3 
                                                        
2 These contextual features make the pressure of deforestation much greater there than, for 
example, in the Tapajós-Arapiuns RESEX in Pará, which has no road access or nearby land 
access to pastureland expansion (although there are many other factors of deforestation).  
3 Another parallel change that has begun to occur is the institutional-legal redefinition of 
RESEXs to accommodate cattle. The territorialized habituses change to ranchers through 
specific processes of ‘intersubjective transformation’ and connections (see Fraser 2018 for a 
framework on how to analyze such changes in detail). In a prior study, Hoelle (2015, 144-
146) argued that migrants in National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) 
settlements have taught the neighboring rubber tappers cattle raising and how to obtain 
‘profits from land’. Hoelle believed that deforestation in the CMER would be kept under 
control, as it takes place mostly at the ‘fringes’; most of the CMER inhabitants are protected 
from becoming deforesting actors due to the ‘land-tenure system in structuring practice’ in 
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By the concept of cattle capitalism, and based on recent interviews and insights from forest 
dwellers in the Amazon,4 I show how ranching expansion inside conservation areas is 
                                                        
an institutionalized way in RESEXs. However, as I show, the land-tenure system has in 
practice already changed to an informal land market, and the moral economic 
transformation seems to enable the expansion of ranching deep inside the CMER.  
 
4 My analysis is based on participant observation among forest dwellers in different parts of 
the Brazilian Amazon since 2005, including several weeks of multisited political ethnography 
(see Schatz 2009) in Acre in May 2017 and in Pará in February 2018, expert interviews with 
powerholders in Brasília in November 2018, and other data that offer a comparative 
perspective on the longer-term research apparatus. Multiple data sources are used: policy 
documents (including internal ICMBio and government documents to which I was given 
access); semistructured interviews (30 in Acre in 2017); observation of dialogues; and 
statistics. These discourses were transcribed. I gathered knowledge about the changing lived 
environments by participant observation, which included moving about the pastures and 
forests targeted by capital with the involved social actors, asking them on site to discuss past 
or foreseen forest cover changes, and spending time among actual policymakers – 
particularly the conservation authorities, forest dwellers and activists but also politicians and 
cattle ranchers. The collected data were used to assess the four essential questions 
suggested by Bernstein (2010): Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? What do 
they do with it? Expert interviews and longer-term interactions with people were used in 
process-tracing the answers to these questions to open up the causalities of deforestation. 
Providing answers to these questions makes the power play involved in agrarian political 
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indicative of a more general moral and political economic transformation to capitalism 
wherein the consideration of long-term sustainability is replaced by the search of fast profits 
at any cost. I understand cattle capitalism as being formed through a series of relations and 
events (to be discussed in the next section) that link local ranches to consumers of meat and 
other ranching products. As this chain is a long and complex one, it must be studied in parts: 
here, I focus on starting from the site of local production expansion to see how in practice 
the meat production system can penetrate even protected Amazon rainforest areas.  
Scholars attempting to identify the most efficient antideforestation policies globally have 
found that such policies vary depending on the commodity frontier in question (Nolte et al. 
2017). It is therefore important to study the type of capitalist system or commodity frontier 
in operation in the transformation of different landscapes (see Moore 2015; Gudynas 2016; 
McKay 2017). When such distinctions are not made, people confuse proximate and ultimate 
causes, allocating the agency and responsibility for deforestation to the wrong actors (as 
many journalists, researchers, bureaucrats, and politicians still do),5 such as the laborers 
engaged in the physical work of destruction at the frontiers of deforestation. Although there 
is a large and rich literature on the structural and agency causes behind deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon (e.g., Campbell 2015; Hecht 2007; Fearnside 2017; Foweraker 1981; Hall 
and Branford 2012), the rise in deforestation inside conservation areas such as the CMER 
                                                        
economy more visible, and assessing these factors allows the exploration of relations 
between political economy/development policies and deforestation. 
5 See, e.g., https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27993-brazils-resettlement-of-farmers-
has-driven-amazon-deforestation/ (accessed 7 January 2018). 
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that has already occurred since the 2000s has not received enough critical attention.6 The 
analysis here seeks to open up some of the complexities in the ultimate and proximate 
causes of deforestation. 
My concept of cattle capitalism addresses just one slice of the large and complex political 
economic system linked to beef and pastures: I assess how deforestation takes place 
through a push by nearby large and medium-sized ranchers with whom (ex-)rubber tappers 
make deals to illegally ‘lease’ their forestlands for pasture conversion or start to ranch 
themselves inside the multiple-use conservation areas where they control land. I study how 
the establishment of ‘cattle capitalism’ inside areas that did not previously have ranches is 
related to deforestation and supported by neodevelopmentalism. I study here just one 
‘variety of cattle capitalism’ that operates inside Brazil. Other, partly interrelated causes of 
deforestation inside the CMER, such as neodevelopmentalism, logging, and the demise of 
extractive economies and their support, are also discussed. Through my concept of cattle 
capitalism, I want to show that it is not just any form of capitalism but a particular 
‘environmental variety of capitalism,’ which means that this commodity frontier has 
particular impacts on lived environments. I analyze how peasants, including rubber tappers 
living inside conservation areas, can be subsumed under cattle capitalism. I will use the case 
of Acre and an iconic multiple-use conservation area there to start to decipher how a vortex 
                                                        
6 Some general studies on the CMER have commented on the deforestation caused by 
ranching expansion (e.g. Vadjunec et al. 2009; Maciel et al. 2018; Mascarenhas et al. 2018), 
but these authors have not engaged in the critical analysis of this important phenomenon.  
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of state, market, and cultural institutions support the hegemony and advance of cattle 
capitalism at the local level.  
The dominant economic groups, such as the meat corporations, gained relatively the most 
capital even under the Workers’ Party (PT) governments (Kröger 2012). Meanwhile, the 
subsidies and other support for establishing and opening export markets for forest dwellers’ 
non-wood-based products waned and vanished almost completely, causing, for example, the 
collapse of rubber-tapping economies (see Jaramillo-Giraldo et al. 2017). These interrelated 
processes are perhaps the most direct economic explanations for why many (ex-)rubber 
tappers – ‘agro-extractive’ (see Fraser et al. 2018, 1383) and other families living inside the 
CMER – have allowed cattle into the reserves, creating patron-client partnerships with large-
scale ranchers, becoming in practice their workers and subsuming their land under the 
imperatives of cattle capitalism. I explore this primary claim and finding.  
I will first introduce what I mean by ‘cattle capitalism’ and explain how this concept helps in 
studying a key driving process of deforestation. Second, I will unite E.P. Thompson’s (1963; 
1971) theory of moral economy with political economic analysis to open up when, how, and 
why ranching expansion occurs or is resisted inside the CMER, i.e., provide tools for 
analyzing the enabling processes of deforestation. In the third section, I will search for varied 
explanations for the deforestation by exploring the ranching and agro-extractive economies 
in the CMER and the roles of roadbuilding, tenure and labor systems and their changes. In 
the final section, I will analyze cattle capitalism through the interactive dynamics of state, 
business, and resistance actions (see Kröger 2013), such as the role of neodevelopmentalist 
policies and objections to them, as this analysis can shed light on the issues of responsibility 
and key agency in driving deforestation. The conclusions section provides broader 
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theoretical lessons, relates them to Brazil’s new authoritarian populism, and summarizes the 
findings.  
 
The Relations of Cattle Capitalism with Deforestation 
In Brazil, recent policy measures favor an accelerated expansion of one of the most 
degrading of land uses, the burning of primary rainforests to plant grasslands for ranching 
(Fraser 2014). Irregularity is rampant, and environmental state institutions are seriously 
understaffed, with the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources (IBAMA) and the Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation (ICMBio) 
having only about ten officers each to monitor illegal deforestation (and other issues) in 
Acre. According to a director of IBAMA (author’s interview, Brasileía 22 May 2017, translated 
from Portuguese), currently, ‘the biggest challenge [in Acre] is the rise in deforestation’ due 
to pervasive ranching. ICMBio officers are fighting against an extremely serious process of 
increased deforestation within many conservation areas. The CMER is the most threatened 
protection area in Brazil (Imazon 2017).7 Established in 1990 and spanning 931,537 ha, it is a 
                                                        
7 The situation in Acre has deteriorated in the direction forecast by Salisbury and Schmink 
(2007), who assessed the struggle between cattle and rubber in an Acre Sustainable 
Development Project (PDS), an INCRA settlement undergoing a major process of 
deforestation via cattle expansion. As INCRA and environmental authorities have not really 
tackled this deforestation, many of my informants perceived that the key state organs had 
been colonized by logging/cattle interests. 
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multiple-use conservation area, a model that has been argued to have multiple benefits vis-
à-vis strict conservation areas (Gomes 2009, 30) – or, at the least, to be the most salient and 
expedient form of conservation, both politically and practically (Fearnside 2017).8 
Amazonian peasants have typically had only a few cows for milk and sustenance (Allegretti 
1990). I observed, however, that herds of dozens, even hundreds, of cattle have become a 
common sight inside the CMER. There are thus different political and moral economies 
related to cattle; broadly speaking, Brazilian ‘cattle capitalism’ could be argued to take two 
main forms, ‘primitive’ and ‘modern’. 
The ‘primitive’ form of cattle capitalism is directly dependent on large territorial expansion: 
it is an established system based on land theft and speculation as forms of value creation as 
well as sales of timber and attempts to enclose the illegally seized lands by deforesting and 
fencing them and placing pasture and cattle on the areas (author’s interview, Ane Alencar, 
IPAM, Brasília, 23 November 2018). This wasteful process represents an estimated 80% of 
Brazilian ranching and is causally related to a rampant form of deforestation that is not 
interested in soil quality or improving the sustainability and yields of ranching via intensive 
pastureland management (which would be an example of a ‘modern’ variety of cattle 
capitalism) (see Fearnside 2017).  
The beef production complex in Brazil is supported by the continued provision of cheap rural 
credit and expansionist government policies that favor the largest meat-processing 
                                                        
8 There is already ample evidence that forest cover is generally much better retained in 
indigenous lands and conservation units (e.g. Nepstad et al. 2006); these have been mostly 
outside the reach of capitalisms. 
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corporations (JBS and Marfrig, the two largest, had received the equivalent of approximately 
3 billion dollars in subsidies as loans from the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES) by 2010), and ranching in the Amazon is a consequence of these land 
use and development policies (Merry and Soares-Filho 2017).9 Although Brazil is the world’s 
leading exporter of bovine meat, the national consumption is more than five times higher 
than the export volume – and the Amazon, and particularly Acre, has the highest per capita 
beef consumption (Hoelle 2017).10 According to my informants (author’s interviews, January 
2019), the CMER herd has a ‘guaranteed market,’ as there are large buyers in Acre; the 
largest freezer company is Betão, which exports the meat to southeastern Brazil and ‘all 
around.’ Even in Xapuri, there are ‘approximately 8 buyers’ who have ‘11 large cattle trucks, 
who sell to 1-2 corporations.’ Interestingly, these eight buyers and truck owners come from 
‘within the reserve’: they are middlemen linking the national meat capitalists and markets 
with the deforested CMER pastures: ‘those who operate this buying, and deliver the meat to 
the freezers, are the sons of the rubber tappers from here within.’ ‘The sons of the natives 
already feel that they dominate a part of this economy,’ and this ‘incentivizes the cattle 
raising,’ as this small group of people is increasingly powerful in creating the market 
                                                        
9 There is no space here to discuss at length what happens in the upper echelons of the 
‘value web’ of cattle capitalism, such as the Brazilian congress and the world’s largest meat 
producers (which are Brazilian and closely linked with the congress).  
10 Per capita beef consumption in Acre has been estimated at 42.25 kilograms per year. Of 
the 9.67 million tons of beef produced in Brazil in 2013, only 1.6 million were exported; the 
rest was consumed in Brazil.  
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channels within and for the expanding cattle capitalist system. This activity creates a 
worrisome ‘type of illusion’ that one could be better off with cattle, and many people follow 
the illusion ‘without planning,’ resulting in only very few (some of the middlemen) 
experiencing economic improvement.  
Deforestation is contingent upon the specific time (e.g., the year or season), place (e.g., near 
rivers or in the western, southern or eastern Amazon), and phase (e.g., new frontier or 
postfrontier) of the process (Fearnside 2017), and this contingency is amply emphasized by 
the political ecology of the Amazon (e.g., Schmink et al. 2017). Many studies have suggested 
different causes – Hoelle (2017), for example, emphasized consumer responsibility and the 
magic of fetishized commoditization as the mechanism hiding the link between consumption 
and environmental damage. But detailed research examining cattle capitalism as a political 
economic system of local and broader-scale power has yet to be undertaken (see, however, 
Adams 2015; Hoelle 2015; Taravella and Sartre 2012); this article is a step in that direction. 
To this end, I will next study regional moral economic changes to better understand when, 
how and why the drive for cattle capitalism advances, i.e., what local changes enable the 
drive to result in deforestation. 
 
The Role of Regional Moral Economies in Deforestation 
A comparison of the regional moral economies of peasants has been fruitful in explaining 
why rural development schemes have succeeded or failed in different parts of Brazil 
(Wolford 2010), leading me to study how changes in the moral economy of the ex-rubber 
tapping, extractive populations of the Amazon might also function in certain circumstances 
as enabling factors for deforestation within the conservation areas that these populations 
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change through their daily practices and decisions about (forest) land use. The concept of 
‘moral economy’ is derived from the work of E.P. Thompson (1963; 1971) and refers to the 
importance of historically established and underlying regional customs, context, and culture 
in explaining why certain political economic changes and policies fail, succeed, encounter 
opposition, or cause demobilization (see, e.g., Wolford 2010, 7-8). Thompson (1963, 63) 
used moral economy to refer to normative attitudes about social relations and behavior in 
immediate economic activities. Moral economy is a useful concept of interpretation and 
explanation to explain such peasant-related transformations for several reasons.  
First, Thompson (1971) found the concept to be useful to explain the resistance by peasant 
societies whose customary landholding regimes were being challenged by capitalist 
advances that were destroying these regimes and thus bringing about the end of prior 
lifestyles. Additionally, in the CMER, the resistance to illegal ranching/logging is based on 
arguments related to an older moral economy that is enshrined in the discourses and 
struggle of Chico Mendes. These arguments teach that the destruction of forests, especially 
by unfair methods such as illegal ranching that jeopardize the neighbors and lead to the ills 
of capitalism that Chico Mendes fought against, is immoral because it subverts the goal that 
the leader of the rubber tappers set for them and other forest populations in his famous 
words: ‘At first I thought I was fighting to save the rubber trees; then I thought I was fighting 
to save the Amazon rainforest. Now I realize I am fighting for humanity.’ In this way, ‘moral 
economy’ can be used as the basis of a systemic analysis of what happens at the social level 
within a process of conflictive deforestation inside a multiple-use conservation area. 
Second, Thompson (1963) argued that a violation of the traditional norms that guide the 
productive and social systems is a violation of the existing moral economy. I will use moral 
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economic discourses referring to such violations (or defending them as actual improvements 
rather than violations), as found in my observations of speeches inside the CMER, as an 
indicator and starting point to analyze how and why deforestation expands inside RESEXs. 
This aspect of moral economy guides the analysis to consider how the moral economy has 
been formed historically and how it is currently changing and affecting the environment. As, 
e.g., Hoelle (2015; 2017) has documented, Acre has been undergoing massive 
transformation in relation to its (de)valuation of forests and increased valuation of beef 
consumption and the ranching way of life. Ane Alencar, the director of the Amazon 
Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), argued (author’s interview, 23 November 2018) 
that there is an important social component explaining deforestation inside the CMER: ‘to be 
extractivist is considered a poor thing in the Amazon, while the rancher casts an image that 
he has money,’ and as the rubber economy has been devalorized, ‘the new generation do 
not see themselves as rubber tappers.’ In addition to this intergenerational territorial 
capture by cattle capitalism, I will show how these moral economic processes of change 
have been partly and paradoxically supported by certain features of the existing rubber 
tapper moral economy (although these processes are also still partly challenged by the 
environmentalist and forest-defending activist aspects of this moral economy).11 The study 
                                                        
11 At the political and moral economic levels that I am assessing here, the current rubber 
tapper moral economy has several paradoxes that revolve around cognitive dissonance 
about the rising valuation of beef (requiring deforestation) and the lingering importance of 
forests. Rubber tappers agreed the most of all the different social groups interviewed by 
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of these moral economic struggles offers insights into how ranching is allowed or not 
allowed to expand. 
 
Cattle Capitalism as a Regionally Dominant Form of Extractivism and Deforestation 
After taking the ferry across the Acre River in Xapuri on the way to the CMER, one sees the 
text ‘The Slaughterhouse of the Rubber Tapper’ written in outsize letters in Portuguese 
above a large painting of a cow on the wall of a building. Cristina Silva (author’s interview 
May 2017), the manager of CMER at ICMBio, with a long history of working for the rubber 
tappers’ organizations around Brazil, told me that the CMER is Brazil’s most problematic 
RESEX ‘in terms of the number of people, cattle, and pasture’: 
If we are not careful, Chico Mendes will turn into a cattle pasture.... The greed for 
pasture and timber, and above all for cattle, is driving up the number of irregular 
occupations. Many people are selling and buying land (colocação), although they are 
not allowed to do this... a total mess. It has become a free market.  
The process of deforestation inside the CMER has accelerated, especially since the 2012 
Forest Code (Mascarenhas et al. 2018),12 but its roots lie in the 1980s. According to an old 
                                                        
Hoelle (2017, 751) with the statement that ‘a lunch with no meat leaves a person weak’ (90 
percent agreed, while 70% of cowboys and 15% of NGO respondents agreed).  
12 The 2012 New Forest Code (Law Nº 12.651) increased deforestation in Brazil (Kröger 
2017). Already before then, the 2006 Law of Management of Public Forests (Nº 11.284) had 
increased logging schemes (Kröger 2018), which degrade forests and thus increase fires, 
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activist (author’s interview May 2017, Brasileía), ‘this business of mass deforestation started 
in 1980 and has gained traction since then’; although the bulk of the direct pressure from 
large-scale ranchers was stopped in the late 1980s by the rubber tappers, ‘the small farmers 
continued’ deforesting. 
Economic Explanations: Cattle and Rubber Economies 
Since the time of Chico Mendes, there has been a substantial change in the economic profile 
of the forest-dwelling people. According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE), the number of cattle remained at approximately 60,000 and 70,000 between 1990 
and 2000 in the important municipality of Xapuri but then tripled between 2000 and 2005 
(from 76,200 to 190,986) (cf. Gomes 2009, 73). The 2000-2005 period clearly marked an 
epochal shift, after which cattle started to spread deeper into the CMER. The president of 
                                                        
opening up terrain for the subsequent expansion of pastures and other forms of 
deforestation (Fearnside 2017). On the positive side, the Lula government’s Action Plan for 
the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm) was effective in 
curbing Amazon deforestation rates, but the third phase of this plan, called Fostering 
Sustainable Production (2012-2015), did not result in lower deforestation (see 
http://redd.mma.gov.br/en/legal-and-public-policy-framework/ppcdam). This third phase 
focused on production, a policy concomitant with constantly rising forest degradation and 
deforestation rates inside multiple-use conservation units since 2011 (see Table 1 herein for 
the government figures: http://www.mma.gov.br/informma/item/616-
preven%C3%A7%C3%A3o-e-controle-do-desmatamento-na-amaz%C3%B4nia.html, accessed 
9 January 2019). 
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one of the five CMER dwellers and producers’ associations, Associação dos Moradores e 
Produtores da RESEX – CM em Xapuri (Amoprex), Tião de Moises, explained how this process 
has been unfolding: 
Today, we have many people in the reserve who do not have the extractivist profile 
and only come here to possess land for sport, to hunt, to fish, to cut wood... thinking 
that a cut-down forest makes more sense than a standing one... ICMBio does not 
take care of this, and no one observes the actions of the state government: the 
situation is truly bad.  
The absence of state policies is most clearly visible in the reduction of subsidies for rubber 
by not providing a high enough fixed price for it. Several ex-rubber tappers told me that the 
prices of rubber and meat explained the transformation towards deforestation: 
Today, as the purchase of rubber has ceased, they have started to destroy the forest 
to plant grass to raise cattle, to produce [parir] calves to sell them and buy food. 
When the rubber had a price, nobody had cattle, but when the price of rubber fell... 
(author’s interview with an extractivist, May 2017, Xapuri) 
Cattle ranching started to be seen as a way to get money faster than was possible by 
traditional forest-based livelihoods; beef cattle were already seen as a useful although 
despised form of insurance among former rubber tappers (Salisbury and Schmink 2007) – 
thus, there was already a hoofprint to be expanded inside the CMER. Acrean rural trade 
union leaders were also beginning to have a positive view of cattle as a source of improved 
income for those living inside forests (see the excerpt in Gomes 2009, 103). However, many 
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told me that the gains associated with cattle should not be overemphasized.13 Declining 
productivity on Amazonian cattle frontiers typically forces ranchers to move deeper into 
forests within 10-15 years; smallholders are a particular case in point, as they do not have 
the access to capital that the larger-scale ranchers have to improve their production 
methods (Schmink et al. 2017, 15). 
There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of sustainability and development and how 
to achieve them in multiple-use conservation areas. The creation of forest-based income 
opportunities was already a key concern for those observing RESEXs from the onset of their 
establishment in the early 1990s: Brown et al. (1992) noted that ‘adverse changes in income 
patterns for rubber tappers could lead to abandonment of extractive reserves or increased 
deforestation within them.’ This result is what we are witnessing now in several parts of the 
CMER as the impacts have flowed outward from the dominant economic system to reach 
even those who were once stalwart activists on behalf of rubber tappers. 
The battle between cattle and rubber is also a moral economic struggle in which discursive 
arguments about the available possibilities for income and livelihoods are key: as two 
informants said, ‘cattle has liquidity’ and ‘cattle fattens if left alone for a month, while latex 
spoils.’ For the pro-forest dwellers, the key would be for the state to create an overarching 
and differentiated development policy for the Amazon and its forest populations, increasing 
                                                        
13 In the current inefficient system (Fearnside 2017, 23), which relies on ‘using the Amazon 
as a frontier’ for expanding beef cattle production at a rate of one head per hectare 
(author’s interview, Cassio Alves, INIAMA, Belém 25 January 2018), cattle profits are short 
term and seriously infringe on future survival possibilities. 
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the budget for subsidies to buy their products, expanding value-added production in the 
Amazon, and providing technical and administrative support in greater quantity (author’s 
interview, Cassio Alves, INIAMA, Belém 25 January 2018).  
There are no publicly available data on the production of forest commodities in the CMER. 
However, based on my interviews with experts with access to the official statistics, between 
2001 and 2015, the production (in tons) of açai grew from 108 to 1,912 and of Brazil nuts 
from approximately 1,400 to 6,100. Thus, two important sources of income have been 
developed. Nonetheless, some informants who are close to the state government observed 
that these figures are not enough to justify the current use of the territory, arguing that 
much more should be produced. They further cited figures showing that the production of 
rubber decreased from 863 to 25 tons, indicating that rubber tapping is vanishing. 
Consequently, for a long time, the key income source for most ‘rubber tapper’ families has 
not been the rubber collected by the menfolk but rather agriculture and the collection of 
nuts and other nonrubber forest products (Hecht 2007, 342). 
According to an expert informant, there was a dramatic increase in the number of cattle in 
Acre between 2001 and 2015: from 1.6 million to approximately 2.9 million.14 In the CMER 
there are already herds numbering over 700. An ex-manager of the CMER told me (author’s 
interview, 12 January 2019) that there are three forms of ranching expansion inside the 
RESEX: 
                                                        
14 The publicly available IBGE figure for 2014 is 2.8 million. 
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1. People buy a small herd of their own, up to 30 head, ‘for sustainability of himself, not 
to become rich, just for security.’ 
2. ‘De meia’: people have the land and rent to a farmer to place cattle there, gaining a 
few head for themselves. The herds can be up to 100 head.  
3. The ex-rubber tapper parcels his colocação illegally with the help of the rancher and 
sells this public land in lots for ranching: ‘The number of these cases is incalculable.’ 
The person ‘does not become rich; he/she ends up selling the land and the cattle but 
does not manage to leave behind its poor living conditions. He remains chained to 
the [large outsider] rancher, who keeps wanting more and more from the person and 
giving very little back in return.’  
Most deforestation takes place through the second and third routes: there are ‘many people 
doing these’ to ‘do the production of de meia’ or to ‘divide the place;’15 in this third option, 
‘the people lose the control.’ Between 2011 and 2016, 92% of deforestation inside the CMER 
took place due to the expansion of the existing ranches; their average size, worryingly, more 
than doubled during this period – leading to a situation in which seringais that have been 
                                                        
15 ‘De meia’ refers to ’half,’ as sometimes in these irregular ‘contracts,’ the peasant gets half 
of the cattle that have been raised after the 3-4 year period by him. According to Tião de 
Moises (25 January 2019), the (ex-)rubber tappers assume the risks and costs in this case: 
they use so much of their own labour time and money to set up the ranch (pasture seed, 
pesticides, salt, etc) that ‘they do not make money with this but live deceived,’ while the one 
‘who gained was the large rancher [who provided the initial herd], as the herd grew and 
fattened, and he took half of it.’ 
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deforested by over 20% have become the norm inside the CMER (Mascarenhas et al. 2018). 
Furthermore, forest degradation is much greater than this clear-cutting figure. 
The process is not uniform: by 2016, over 1,000 ha of 28 of the 46 seringais in the CMER had 
been deforested and over 2,000 ha of ten seringais; only ten had less than 500 ha deforested 
(see Mascarenhas et al. 2018, 246). This discrepancy requires an explanation. I will next 
analyze the government and resistance politics and policies that help to explain where and 
how ranching expanded. This analysis illustrates that while the change in economic 
opportunities discussed above did play a role, politics and the active forging of contentious 
agency (see Kröger 2013, discussed below), or the absence of resistance to ranching, were 
important in defining where pasturelands expanded and where they did not. The interplay 
between government strategies, capitalist expansions and resistance – in their impact on the 
moral economy – needs to be analyzed to explain the politics of deforestation. 
 
The Dynamics of Cattle Capitalism, Neodevelopmentalism, and Resistance Agency 
Government policies, even by the PT-led coalitions, have greatly expanded ranching inside 
the CMER. This expansion illustrates how even well-intended social welfare expansion has 
caused under-the-radar deforestation and environmental degradation when a key 
government policy has promoted the type of neodevelopmentalism that the Frente Popular 
do Acre (FPA) coalition governments adopted (see Fantini and Crisóstomo 2009). The FPA 
ruled Acre between 1999 and 2018. The parties composing it fluctuated, but some have 
argued that the PT, the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), the Brazilian Socialist Party 
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(PSB), and the Party of National Mobilization (PMN) composed the decision-making core.16 
According to Sant’Ana Junior (2006), there is a long-standing divide within this coalition 
between those in favor of sustainability or development (‘sustentabilistas’ and 
‘desenvolvimentistas’); for the latter, as early as 2000, sustainable development no longer 
signified environmental development that would privilege ecology and preservation; they 
saw the Amazon’s forests as a source of great wealth, as money signals that could be turned 
into capital. This division within the coalition has been seen as resulting in a schizophrenic 
government that retained the initial environmentalist slogans mostly as tools of political 
marketing (Pinheiro 2010) and used the environmental discourse to silence the multiple 
knowledges of the forest populations and indoctrinate those populations to accept the 
government policies, which are no longer as much in favor of forest protection as of 
expanding ranching (Passaro 2012).  
The CMER still has a well-organized social movement of rubber tappers, but this resistance is 
a shrinking minority. Organizing and politicizing a mass social movement whose core 
ideology is to retain a lived environment with rich standing forests is a key strategy in forging 
this resistance agency.17 This strategy influences the moral economy. Communities where 
                                                        
16 See http://www.vermelho.org.br/noticia/20231-1 (accessed 17 January 2019) 
17 Organizing and politicizing are two separate tactics for creating social movements (see 
Kröger 2013). By resistance agency, I refer to strategies of resistance that forge activists, that 
is, increase contentious agency; this is not thus just any type of isolated resistance act but 
signifies a broader process of creating new and more lasting collective, territorialized 
habituses, through a particular set of strategies. 
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this strategy continues to be fostered by activists have seen much less or no deforestation, 
in contrast to those where the ideology of ranching and/or logging, swift revenue, and 
consumption-based life trajectories has gained hold, as I observed across the different 
regions of the CMER and in Pará RESEXs. At one meeting that I attended, the old activists 
criticized a proposed increase in forestry through selective logging as mere fantasy that 
would lead to pastureland in practice. They tried to persuade the people to remain true to 
their rubber tapper roots, as illustrated by these words of a senior political leader in May 
2017 : 
Do you think that for the number of years that I’ve lived here, if I deforested, this 
forest would exist? It wouldn’t; there would be only pasture. This is why my 
colleague here argued that cattle are not sustainable, and I agree with him. It is 
inhumane to have [ranching] in the forest because it is the biggest enemy of the 
forest and for our region. I hate and fear deforestation. 
While this type of support of forest-conserving moral economies existed especially among 
the families and communities of older activists, the expansion of cattle capitalism inside the 
reserve especially attracted young people who had finished their schooling, had gone to 
work for commercial ranchers and were consequently learning the modes of production and 
lifestyles of ranchers: 
You can’t imagine how many people are using agro-toxics and turning their backs on 
latex extraction, helping their parents, and the exploration of good things. Why? 
Because they study, finish their high school but have nothing to do; so they end up as 
spreaders of poison for ranchers. Once they return from there, their minds have 
been shaped by ranching, and they take a large stretch of forest from their parents 
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and put it to grass and cattle... Before, the rancher stayed outside of the reserve, but 
today, he is inside here. (Author’s interview, Tião de Moises)18 
A medium-scale rancher made the implicit point that the large ranchers are not worried 
about the cattle causing deforestation: 
They don’t care... they want to make it possible for everybody to have cattle; they 
want to help. If you have a farm with an extra 50 hectares of pasture, they will give 
you the cattle and offer you 50-70% of the sales price for you to stay calm. They are 
in need of land at times, as their pastures grow too small [for their oversized herds]. 
Therefore, they search for someone to whom they can cede their cattle. 
Deforestation continues, as the state and municipal governments are not trying to amend 
the situation: ‘I do not see this as an issue to which the mayors, or even the city councilors, 
would pay attention. The cooperative is seeing this happening and is worried, but the 
government is not very attentive about this.’ In addition, Tião de Moises claimed that among 
the key policies driving deforestation in the CMER were ‘the delivery of roads and electricity 
                                                        
18 There has been a generational change: many young people no longer know what uses 
trees can have or what trees there are and are unaware of the forest around them. 
However, they do not have the same social, cultural or economic capital as their city peers to 
seek urban jobs. According to my informants, many CMER teenagers have ended up in 
marginal positions and in prisons as they have moved away from the reserve.  
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for all, bolsa familia (family grants), and rural credit,’ which are directed primarily and almost 
solely towards ranching expansion.19  
New systems of valuation and moral and political economies are also built by the circulation 
of specific discourses, in particular by those in power, and these challenge the old moral 
economy. The ongoing and strongly moral discourses attacking and defending the advance 
of logging and ranching inside the CMER are a sign of the underlying moral economy being 
challenged. The modern moral economy of the neodevelopmentalists and those in favor of 
neoliberal individualistic enrichment has discourses of its own that challenge the claims that 
deforestation for ranching would be bad – also on moral and ethical grounds – and new 
customs of what is considered just usage of territories and the right type of economic 
activity. I observed a PT municipal councilor from Brasileía arguing at a public meeting inside 
the reserve for the need to ‘develop,’ which would also be possible by allowing ranches: ‘The 
forest cannot interfere in human lives; it must complement them.’ 
The municipal councilor went on to promote the idea that trees should be used to make 
furniture and other valuable wood-based products, explaining that he is in favor not of 
complete conservation but of ‘sustainable management.’ ‘Poverty’ was framed as the key 
problem and getting rich as the goal: ‘We have the greatest wealth in the world, but we are 
poor: why? How can it be that I am a gold miner and do not have a gold ring on my finger? 
There is no justification for this, right?’ Education and sustainability were thus embedded in 
                                                        
19 The seringais close to the towns of Xapuri, Brasiléia and Epitaciolândia have become the 
most deforested, and the existence of access roads explained about 80% of deforestation in 
a 2013 study (Mascarenhas et al. 2018). 
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a worldview in which trees seen primarily as timber were an integral element of 
development, and no problems were envisaged in the promotion of cattle inside the 
reserves; rather, the councilor saw the expansion of cattle-based industries alongside 
logging as providing a joint solution to problems of development. These messages, however, 
echoed Bolsonaro’s speeches much better than the official Workers’ Party policy of 
‘florestania’ in Acre: in January 2019 (author’s interviews), the majority of people in the 
CMER had come to accept the view that ‘other countries and states deforested out there, 
and now we should pay for this?,’ which explains the new moral and political economy in 
which ‘the natives themselves inside the reserve see that destruction is the only path.’ 
The president of Amoprex, Tião de Moises, noted that the youths consider what they are 
living through and seeing – the process of deforestation – a normal state of affairs: one 
makes a living by getting rid of the forest and expanding pastures. 
Have you wondered how many children and students are assisting in the destruction 
of the forest..., the division of colocações and the illegal sale of the parcels, timber 
extraction, the spreading of poisons, the devastation of the forest...? They are going 
to grow up seeing this.... It is being destroyed; nobody values it. (Author’s interview 
23 May 2017) 
In a follow-up interview on 25 January 2019, Tião de Moises explained that although 
‘clandestine loggers’ and outsiders are expanding pastures, the people who ‘cut all the trees 
in their areas and sell them clandestinely to put pastures there’ are the ‘children of the 
natives from within the reserve.’ These younger members of the community 
learned to live within this model. They do not want to collect latex or nuts anymore, 
saying that this gives little money. They want to get rid of the trees and plant 
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pastures. This became a habit for them as if they were ranchers; he is the guy with 
the bull, the guy with the boots, the guy with the brimmed hat, with the lasso, 
understood? 
The prevalence of these types of stories is a clear indicator that not all supposed welfare 
policies, such as schools and roads extended in a general manner, result in an improvement 
in the quality of life. Many of these neodevelopmentalist measures reduce the possibility of 
continuing the extractivist way of living and, moreover, transform the children of rubber 
tappers into agents of deforestation. These findings suggest that the intertwining of 
extractive capitalism and neodevelopmentalism, including the expansion of social policies 
and access to forest dwellers, is causally connected to deforestation and forest degradation. 
The expansion of schooling that is not tailored to the needs and realities of the Amazon 
agro-extractive populations living inside conservation areas, the spread of modern 
valuations of urban life, and Acre’s strong cowboy culture that surrounds the CMER are 
partial explanations of how the surrounding political and moral economy has changed a 




This study has assessed the dynamics of deforestation and conservation in the Amazon 
through the lens of the state of Acre in Brazil, particularly the CMER by analyzing forest 
cover changes in this pivotal multiple-use conservation area. This article focused on the 
CMER in order to track the local dynamics by which cattle capitalism is expanding, driven by 
a process that extends from top-level politicians and large ranchers to (former) rubber 
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tappers living within a conservation area. The analysis sheds light on the causes of 
deforestation by illustrating how neodevelopmentalist welfare policies that are considered 
benign can also drive deforestation, especially 1) when taking place inside conservation 
areas and 2) in regions where deforesting sectors dominate the political economy. 
Furthermore, 3) this political economic analysis was united with a study of moral economic 
struggles to analyze how and why deforestation takes place. The findings are also relevant 
for the natural sciences, which have found that the Amazon is rapidly changing due to the 
interplay of climate change and increased infrastructural and large-scale projects causing 
deforestation (Fearnside 2017). The synergistic interactions stemming from forest clearing, 
fragmentation, logging, and fire may eventually force the Amazon into a gradual process of 
savannization (Nobre et al. 1991); indeed, this is the current prognosis, given the Bolsonaro 
government’s policies supporting deforestation. Thus, the political and moral economic 
causes studied here are increasingly important in order to understand and govern the 
changing climate and political ecology.  
E.P. Thompson’s (1963) concept of moral economy was used to explain the underlying 
transformations and the deeper and historically built socioeconomic structures that partially 
enabled the push of cattle capitalism in this particular moral economic context. Acre rubber 
tappers have a history of being exploited through the aviamento system, which did not allow 
them to form the extensive agricultural settlements or autonomy and mutuality-based 
relations that were developed in the relatively less dominated regions of the Amazon, such 
as the Madeira River, studied by Fraser et al. (2018). The idea, even after driving out bosses 
and stopping ranchers, was for the people to extract rubber and other non-wood-based 
products and to process these products for the market through their own cooperatives. 
However, this concept was a very large attempted leap from the prior indentured debt 
30 
 
relations – Chico Mendes and his fellow activists were attempting to overcome the burden 
of centuries of accumulated moral economic thinking and feeling about what kinds of 
economic relations one should make a living by, and with whom. With the advance of cattle 
capitalism, the CMER is witnessing a similar ‘return of the moral economy’ of colonial-type 
relations, as the rubber tappers no longer produce for their own cooperatives but instead 
accept offers of cheap labor and forestland access from outside capitalists to become once 
again the access point for those seeking wealth based on using forests (including destroying 
them through logging/ranching) and to take a small slice of the returns as ‘extractivists’ 
linking the extractor and the extracted commodity.  
The weakness of mass resistance in the present-day CMER, in the form of the united 
blockades of logging and pasture expansion that the rubber tappers organized in the 1970s 
and 1980s, is indicative of the serious weakening and porousness of the underlying moral 
economy of forest populations who seek to ‘live from, in, and for forests’ (as the CMER 
promotional posters still propose). In a Marxist sense, this weakening is indicative of a 
process whereby the moral economy of the rubber tappers has lost power vis-à-vis ‘raw 
money power’ as money has increasingly become the basis for community ‘dissolving the 
traditional community’ (see Harvey 2010, 294). However, the ranching expansion is also 
indicative of the strengthening of another moral economy whose values, customs, and 
legitimizing beliefs regarding the consensus of the wider community (see Thompson 1971, 
50) are derived from an individualistic, consumerist and immediatist cowboy culture. This is 
‘greed for and by cattle; they think that money comes fast through ranching,’ as an ex-CMER 
manager told me (author’s interview, 12 January 2019). ‘Cattle is the ambition’; getting more 
cattle and expanding the herd become the goals; and ‘capitalism forces him to think in this 
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way; he thinks that the cattle are his security and will take him out of misery, while in reality, 
he is going deeper into misery.’  
Theoretically, while the business part of de facto selling the forest for logging and ‘leasing’ 
the land for ranching are signs of what Thompson (1963) would consider a vanishing of the 
‘peasant moral economy,’ I suggest that the neodevelopmentalist and even the cowboy 
culture are rather signals of a ‘modern moral economy,’ mixing the idealism of consumerism 
and welfare increase at the cost of the forests. The changes in the moral and political 
economy studied here help to explain why the leftist parties lost almost everything to 
Bolsonaro and his allies in Acre. In terms of Thompson’s (1971, 98) view of peasant moral 
economy as a legitimator of peasant protests, the fierce speeches of Bolsonaro and his allies 
against land occupations and other forms of socioenvironmental protest should be seen as 
attempts to make preemptive strikes against the well-established ‘popular ethic’ in Brazil 
that sanctions ‘direct action by the crowd’; at the same time, it should be noted that 
Bolsonaro’s apparatus focuses on delivering new moral economic points of reference for the 
people based on a variety of Brazilian conservative Christianity. These points of reference 
should be seen as attempts to strike at the root mechanisms of how ‘contentious agency’ in 
general is built (see Kröger 2013). 
Instead of arguing that the expansion of modern individual property rights (as e.g., de Soto 
1989 argues and the Temer and Bolsonaro government agrarian reform policies are carrying 
out) or access roads within the RESEXs are the solution (as the neodevelopmentalist 
‘progressive’ politicians also did; see Gudynas 2016), the findings presented here suggest 
that actions of this sort do not lead to the desired outcomes, as the dominant economic 
sector, in this case cattle capitalism, abuses them. Gladson Cameli, Acre’s new governor as 
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of 2019, has promised to turn the state into a vast soybean plantation, favoring 
corporations; e.g., Blairo Maggi has said that he wants to buy 20,000 hectares of land in Acre 
for soybean cultivation (Pontes 2019). Cameli has promised tenure security without the 
need to worry about environmental rules, and the state’s new environmental minister is a 
rancher. The 80% increase in deforestation in Acre in 2018 is likely to be supplanted by an 
even higher figure in 2019 (ibid.); thus, Acre is likely to emulate the prior deforestation 
pattern in Rondônia, where conservation areas have been seriously fragmented (see 
Pedlowski et al. 2005). Indeed, Cameli wants Acre to follow the model of Rondônia.   
The findings presented in this article suggest that several interlinked, underlying but also 
agentive processes seem to drive deforestation and cause an increasing number of rubber 
tappers to contribute to it: 1) the spread of de facto individual property rights and 2) 
universal modernizing neodevelopmentalism (extending roads, schooling, electricity) that is 
not suited to the realities of Amazonian multiple-use conservation areas. These two 
processes are used by the surrounding ranching, logging and land speculation frontier 
through which 3) cattle capitalists and other dominant economic groups seek to expand into 
conservation areas and increasingly succeed when 4) subsidies for non-wood-based forest 
products are cut, 5) the number and resources of environmental officers are reduced to a 
bare minimum, and 6) the forging of contentious agency is made more difficult and fails in 
numerous places due to 7) generational changes dividing lands and making collective 
decision making harder, particularly as 8) youngsters have been steeped in the region’s 
impeding cowboy culture, and 9) the turning of prior forest-valuing progressive politician 
allies into supporters of logging and ranching inside conservation areas legitimizes and seeks 
to hide this transformation and counter the resistance.  
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Building roads and extending power lines deep into the RESEXs (instead of, for example, 
creating electricity without extensive grids) and offering access to ranching credit have led, 
directly and indirectly, to greater deforestation, both by those living inside the reserves and 
by outsiders. Furthermore, developmental discourses that frame the existing lives, 
livelihoods, and lived environments of people without these basic provisions as backward or 
miserable, promulgated both by right-wing and left-wing politicians, are not helping; rather, 
they ease the ‘modernization’ of forest areas by transforming them into cattle country. 
Further theorizing of ‘cattle capitalism’ as a specific environmental variety of capitalism, with 
regional variations and several subparts – which, for example, drive deforestation – should 
be undertaken in future research. 
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